

## Specific Features Of State Lobbism In Modern Policy

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### Annotation

The article is dedicated to a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of state lobbying in modern politics. The principle that lobbying is not only the activity of non-state interest groups, but also a specific form of political activity of state bodies and institutions is substantiated. It is shown that in the context of developed democratic systems, the state can act simultaneously as a subject, object, and client of lobbying activities. Special attention is paid to distinguishing between the concepts of lobbying, state policy, and corruption, as well as analyzing state lobbying in domestic and foreign policy. The necessity of a narrowly legal rather than a politological approach to the study of lobbying as a complex and multi-level socio-political phenomenon is concluded.

**Keywords:** lobbying, state lobbying, interest groups, pressure groups, political institutions, state power, international lobbying, lobbying subject, lobbying object.

### Introduction

In political science, the phenomenon of lobbying continues to be the subject of sharp scientific discussions, despite its persistent presence in real political practice. The widespread use of lobbying mechanisms in the activities of state and non-state actors is accompanied by insufficient theoretical reflection, which is especially noticeable in works focused primarily on the legal interpretation of this phenomenon. Such a limitation of the research field does not allow for adequate reflection of the complexity and multidimensionality of influencing political decision-making processes.

In this context, the problem of understanding state lobbying is of particular importance. In scientific literature, it is often argued that lobbying activity is an exclusive prerogative of non-governmental structures, while the state is interpreted only as an object of influence. Meanwhile, the practice of modern politics testifies to the fact that government bodies themselves actively use lobbying technologies to advance their own institutional, economic, and foreign policy interests.

The purpose of this study is to theoretically reinterpret the phenomenon of lobbying, with a focus on analyzing the state as a full-fledged participant in lobbying processes. This involves moving beyond a narrow legal approach and turning to the tools of political science, which allow us to identify the real mechanisms of the functioning of power.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of lobbying research:

The concept of "lobbying" was historically formed in Anglo-Saxon political tradition and initially denoted the practice of informal influence on the process of making political decisions. Later, this term became widespread and began to be used to denote the institutionalized forms of representation of interests.

In legal science, lobbying is generally defined as the activity of representatives of non-governmental organizations aimed at influencing government bodies to make or reject certain decisions. Such an interpretation allows for a clear distinction between legal and illegal forms of influence, but it proves insufficient for analyzing real political processes.

The political approach, on the contrary, stems from the recognition of conflict and

competition of interests within the political system. From this point of view, lobbying represents a mechanism for articulating and aggregating interests, in which various actors, including government structures, can participate. Methodologically, this research relies on systemic and institutional approaches, as well as the principle of analyzing developed political forms, which allows for the identification of stable patterns in the functioning of lobbying.

State as a subject and object of lobbying activity:

A key theoretical issue in the study of lobbying is determining the place of the state in the system of interaction between political actors. Classical lobbying models, as a rule, proceed from the notion of the state as a passive object of pressure from organized interests. However, such an interpretation does not reflect the institutional complexity of modern state power.

State bodies have their own interests, determined by the logic of the functioning of political institutions, the distribution of resources, and the struggle for influence within the power system. In this regard, they often initiate and carry out actions that are inherently relevant to lobbying activities. The executive branch can purposefully influence legislative structures, agencies can defend their positions in interdepartmental competition, and regional authorities can promote their own interests at the national level. Thus, the state acts not only as an arbitrator in the process of reconciling interests, but also as an independent actor of political influence. The dual role of the state confirms the need to revise the traditional concepts of the subjects and objects of lobbying.

State lobbying in domestic policy:

In domestic policy, state lobbying manifests itself primarily through the activities of executive bodies. Government structures utilize various formal and informal

mechanisms to influence parliament, political parties, and public opinion. In countries with developed democracy, these practices are generally institutionalized and within the framework of legal regulation.

The phenomenon of parliamentary lobbying, when the deputies themselves and parliamentary factions act as intermediaries between interest groups and the state apparatus, is of particular interest. In such cases, the boundary between the subject and object of lobbying becomes blurred, confirming the need for flexible analytical tools. In conditions of weak democratic institutions, state lobbying often takes distorted forms and converges with corrupt practices. The lack of transparent rules and control mechanisms leads to lobbying being perceived negatively by society and associated with abuse of power.

State lobbying in foreign policy:

In the international arena, state lobbying is most clearly manifested. Every state possesses a set of national interests and strives to promote them in the system of international relations, using various lobbying technologies. In foreign policy, the state can act in three main roles: as a lobbying subject promoting its own interests; as a client hiring professional lobbyists and consultants abroad; and as an object of influence from foreign states and transnational corporations. Such multidimensionality makes international lobbying practically impossible for full legal regulation. A feature of state lobbying at the international level is its close connection with foreign policy strategy and the use of state power resources. In extreme forms, this can lead to interference in the internal affairs of other states and support for the change of political regimes, which significantly expands the traditional understanding of lobbying.

Correlation of lobbying, government policy, and corruption:

An important theoretical task is to distinguish between the concepts of lobbying, state policy, and corruption. Lobbying as an institution involves transparent procedures, legal channels of influence, and public accountability. State policy, in turn, represents the official activity of government bodies in implementing adopted decisions.

Corruption arises in cases where lobbying activities are carried out covertly, using illegal methods and for the personal benefit of officials. Consequently, the problem lies not in the very existence of state lobbying, but in the lack of effective mechanisms for its regulation and public control.

#### **Conclusion:**

The analysis conducted allows us to assert that state lobbying is not a deviation from the norm, but a legitimate element of the functioning of the modern political system. Its existence is due to the complex structure of power, the multiplicity of interests, and the competition of political and economic actors. The state, possessing a monopoly on making universally binding decisions, inevitably involves itself in the processes of articulation and promotion of interests, which gives lobbying an institutional character.

State lobbying manifests itself both in domestic and foreign policy, taking various forms - from the pressure of the executive branch on parliament to the use of specialized lobbying structures abroad. In the conditions of developed democratic institutions, these practices are subject to legal and public control, while in states with transitional and authoritarian political regimes, they often acquire a latent character and become closer to corruption mechanisms.

Recognition of the state as a subject of lobbying allows for a new perspective on the nature of political power and the role of public institutions. The state appears not as a neutral arbiter, but as an active participant

in the struggle of interests, which requires a more realistic and critical approach to the analysis of political processes.

The prospects for further research of state lobbying are linked to a deep comparative analysis of political systems, the study of mechanisms for the legal regulation of lobbying activities, and the development of models for enhancing the transparency and accountability of state power. This is especially relevant for countries undergoing institutional transformation, where the formation of legitimate forms of representation of interests is an important condition for democratic development.

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